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Detecting and Reversing the Decline in
Horizontal Merger Enforcement
BY JONATHAN B. BAKER AND CARL SHAPIRO

D

U R I N G T H E 1 9 6 0 S , H O R I ZO N TA L
merger enforcement was simple, but also inflexible and overly stringent. Courts and enforcers
relied on the “structural presumption” of harm to
competition from increasing market concentration. This formula based enforcement almost entirely on
market definition and market shares. The rules were clear, but
they discouraged pro-competitive mergers.
Now, some forty years later, horizontal merger enforcement has been transformed, largely for the better. The structural presumption remains in force, but it is dramatically
weaker. Courts and enforcers today place less weight on market structure, pay closer attention to possible expansion by
smaller suppliers and entry by new ones, and exhibit less
hostility to merger efficiencies.
We support the modern approach, with its more nuanced,
fact-intensive economic inquiry focusing on mechanisms of
competitive effects. We are concerned, however, that some
courts and enforcement officials have misused this discretion
and flexibility. These decision makers appear overly willing to
accept defense arguments about entry, expansion, and efficiencies, while downplaying the loss of competition inherent
in the proposed merger.
In this article, we document recent problems with horizontal merger enforcement, sketch our diagnosis of their
causes, argue that merger enforcement has become too lax,
and suggest a proposed solution. Our analysis is largely drawn
from our forthcoming book chapter, which provides a more
extensive discussion.1 A narrow portion of that chapter, where
we document the decline of enforcement by the Justice
Department during the George W. Bush administration, has
been criticized by some associated with that administration.
We go beyond the analysis in our chapter here to address
those criticisms.
Jonathan Baker is Professor of Law, American Univer sity, and Carl
Shapiro is Transamerica Professor of Business Strategy, Haas School of
Business, University of California at Berkeley.

Evaluating the Accuracy of Horizontal Merger
Enforcement
There is no easy way to evaluate horizontal merger enforcement in the courts and at the DOJ and the FTC. As
explained below, our approach is to rely on several different
categories of evidence.
The most compelling way to evaluate the accuracy of
merger enforcement policy would be through merger retrospectives—detailed studies evaluating the actual effects of
consummated mergers on market prices, product variety,
or innovation. The most revealing mergers to study in depth
are those that went forward despite presenting serious
antitrust concerns. Armed with a large number of such studies, one could, in principle, identify the conditions under
which horizontal mergers do, and do not, harm consumers.
One could also evaluate the accuracy of the models and
techniques used to evaluate proposed mergers, and use the
results to develop more accurate techniques for merger evaluation.2 Unfortunately, while considerable work has been
done on merger retrospectives, especially for airline, banking, and hospital mergers, the current state of knowledge
about the actual effects of mergers on consumers remains
fragmentary.3
Lacking comprehensive information based on merger retrospectives, the accuracy of horizontal merger enforcement
can still be evaluated by looking at key enforcement and
non-enforcement decisions and evaluating the economic reasoning used in those decisions. Litigated mergers typically
generate a substantial public record, allowing outsiders as
well as the court to review the agency’s decision to challenge.
We are keenly aware that in many cases where one of the
agencies declines to challenge a proposed merger, a great deal
of the information available to that agency is confidential and
thus unavailable to outsiders. But this information asymmetry cannot and should not be used to shield agency enforcement decisions from any meaningful external review.
In cases where no enforcement action was taken, evaluating the agency’s economic reasoning is greatly facilitated if
detailed information about the industry is publicly available
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and especially if the agency issues a closing statement explaining its reasoning. In our book chapter, we describe the March
2006 decision by the DOJ not to challenge Whirlpool’s
acquisition of Maytag as a highly visible instance of underenforcement. We critique and criticize the economic reasoning in the DOJ’s closing statement.4
Identifying Trends in Horizontal Merger
Enforcement
So far we have discussed how to evaluate the accuracy of
merger enforcement. Separately, one can analyze changes over
time in merger enforcement. Put crudely: Has enforcement
become more lax or more stringent over time? Trends are far
easier to identify and document than accuracy. Of course, the
two concepts are closely related: if merger enforcement currently is well-calibrated to produce accurate decisions following a significant decline in stringency, it must have been
overly stringent earlier. Likewise, if merger enforcement was
well calibrated earlier and then declined significantly in stringency, it must currently be overly lax.
Survey Evidence. One of the goals of our study was to
test the hypothesis that merger enforcement has become
more lax in recent years. To do so, we conducted a survey of
twenty experienced antitrust practitioners, taken from a
third-party list of leading antitrust lawyers in the District of
Columbia. Our survey respondents consistently reported
that the “likelihood of successful agency review for the merging firms” for a given horizontal merger is sharply higher now
(March 2007) than it would have been ten years ago (when
Joel Klein ran the DOJ and Robert Pitofsky headed the
FTC). On a five-point scale, with 5 corresponding to “significantly more favorable,” the average score was 4.9. By asking about a given horizontal merger, this question was
designed to correct for any possible shift in the mix of deals
presented to the agencies. Our survey respondents perceived
changes in merger enforcement occurring at all stages of the
merger review process: fewer second requests, a greater likelihood that an investigation will be closed rather than lead to
an enforcement action, and a willingness to accept weaker
remedies in those cases where enforcement actions are taken.
We believe that our survey provides compelling evidence
that there has been a sharp shift over the past ten years
towards a less stringent horizontal merger enforcement policy.5 The survey responses also confirmed that the shift has
been much more pronounced at the DOJ than at the FTC.
Additionally, we asked our survey respondents whether they
saw a significant substantive difference today between merger enforcement at the DOJ and the FTC. On a five-point
scale, where 5 corresponds to the DOJ being significantly
tougher, the mean score was 1.9, indicating that the DOJ is
generally seen as more lax.
Our survey respondents reported a shift towards more lax
merger enforcement, regardless of whether or not they judged
that shift to be in the public interest. Many respondents
expressed concern that merger enforcement has become too
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lax. Others applauded the current policy as a welcome shift
from an overly stringent policy ten years ago. Both groups
detected the shift. Indeed, so far as we can tell, there is a consensus among antitrust practitioners who follow merger
enforcement closely that such a shift has occurred, except perhaps among the decision makers at the agencies during the
current administration.
Merger Enforcement Data. Merger enforcement data
provide another method for identifying trends in merger
enforcement.6 These data have the advantage of being objective and comprehensive, and covering a much longer time
period, twenty-five years. The key statistic is agency enforcement actions (litigation, consent settlements, and abandonments) as a fraction of Hart-Scott-Rodino (HSR) filings.
This statistic was constructed and analyzed for the years
1982 to 2000 by Commissioner Thomas Leary, and updated through the first eleven months of fiscal year 2007 by us.7
In Leary’s data, merger enforcement actions averaged 0.9
percent of HSR filings during the typical term at one agency
(or 1.8 percent at both agencies combined). The low absolute
level of these figures reflects the commonplace observation
that most mergers do not raise serious antitrust concerns.
The enforcement rate bottomed out at only 0.4 percent—
less than half the average—at the DOJ during two separate
time periods. Indeed, the most striking feature of these data
is how far the DOJ enforcement rate fell during these periods, relative to the historical average. The first period with a
0.4 percent enforcement rate occurred during the second
term of the Reagan administration. The data from that period are consistent with contemporaneous reports that senior
officials frequently overruled staff recommendations to challenge acquisitions, and the few mergers that were challenged
were typically mergers to very high levels of concentration.
The second low point for merger enforcement was at the
DOJ during both terms of the George W. Bush administration. These merger enforcement data are consistent with our
survey results.
These figures can be interpreted as reflecting merger
enforcement activity at the agencies—and in particular as
demonstrating lax merger enforcement at the DOJ during the
current administration—with two important caveats emphasized in our book chapter. First, merger enforcement rates
may be affected by unobservable changes in the composition
of HSR filings. For example, the current DOJ enforcement
figures could be low without reflecting a change in the underlying enforcement policy if they now include a greater proportion of non-horizontal mergers involving private equity
and hedge fund buyers that do not tend to raise competition
issues. This possibility has been pressed by some of our critics from the current administration.8
We are skeptical of this benign interpretation of the low
merger enforcement rate during the current administration,
however. It cannot rationalize the recent drop in DOJ
enforcement actions unless an implausibly large fraction of
all HSR filings now involve non-horizontal deals. The sta-

tistics cited by Timothy Muris do not convince us otherwise.9 Muris relies on horizontal overlaps in the 4-digit SIC
industry codes and 6-digit NAICS industry codes reported
by merging firms when specifying their business activities in
their HSR filings. Yet most of the mergers recorded as horizontal on this basis are probably not actually horizontal in
the sense relevant to antitrust analysis. These industry codes
describe groups of activities that are generally far broader
than antitrust product markets,10 and even if they share an
antitrust product market they may be located in different
geographic markets. For these reasons, most of these mergers likely involve complementary business activities. This
interpretation is consistent with the magnitude of the horizontal overlaps suggested by these data: we very much doubt
that anything like half to two-thirds of proposed mergers
during any time period involved meaningful overlaps in relevant antitrust markets, as the approach taken by Muris
implicitly assumes. Any shift in the fraction of “horizontal”
overlaps computed according to the Muris method is most
likely dominated by fluctuations in the percentage of deals
that involve complementary activities, not substitutes, and
is unlikely to reveal much about the possibility that the proportion of true horizontal mergers changed over time.11
Even if the HSR overlap statistics relied upon by Muris are
taken seriously as measures of horizontal overlap, they do not
provide a benign explaination for the low rate of merger
enforcement during the current administration. The overlap
averaged 60.9 percent during the second term of the Clinton
administration, and was only slightly lower, 58.7 percent,
during the first term of the current administration, so these
data could not explain the low enforcement rate at DOJ
during the Bush administration’s first term.12 Even if the
larger decline in horizontal overlaps cited by Muris is considered an accurate measure of a decrease in true horizontal
overlaps, moreover, that decline accounts for only about
three-sevenths of the additional non-horizontal filings that
would be necessary to rationalize the low DOJ enforcement
rate in terms of private equity and hedge fund deals. Even
then, that interpretation could only be reconciled with the
absence of a comparably large drop in enforcement actions at
the FTC during the current administration by assuming,
again implausibly, that the bulk of the new private equity and
hedge fund deals involve industries in which DOJ rather
than the FTC would be expected to review the merger.
Second, and even more important, the mix of deals presented to the agencies, in terms of the severity of antitrust
issues they raise, depends in part on what firms anticipate
from antitrust enforcers. Firms learn about changing agency
enforcement patterns from their antitrust advisors, who track
enforcement trends. To the extent that advice is informed and
heeded, we would expect to see a similar fraction of challenged deals every year, mainly comprised of “judgment calls”
close to the line, regardless of where the line is drawn. It is
unlikely that this adjustment is instantaneous, however, as it
may take time for lawyers to infer changes in agency views

from enforcement decisions and official rhetoric, and perhaps
longer for clients to be convinced.
For this reason, an unusually low enforcement rate figure
should be interpreted as indicating an unanticipated recent
decrease in merger enforcement, and an unusually high figure should be interpreted as indicating an unanticipated
recent increase in merger enforcement. Therefore, changes in
enforcement rates will tend to underestimate changes in
enforcement, in both directions. This observation justifies
interpreting large, sustained dips in the enforcement rate to
levels below the norm as reflecting substantially more lax
merger enforcement.13
Under this interpretation, the strikingly low merger
enforcement rate at the DOJ during the second term of the
Reagan administration suggests that the Antitrust Division
under AAGs Ginsburg and Rule surprised the antitrust bar
with their lack of interest in challenging mergers, consistent
with the view that the Antitrust Division during that period
was unusually permissive toward horizontal mergers. Similarly, the sustained and equally low enforcement rate at the
DOJ during the current administration means that enforcement has been surprisingly low—at the start after accounting for any initial expectations that a new Republican administration might resolve close cases more in favor of permitting
mergers than would the Democratic administration that preceded it, and over time after accounting for what antitrust
advisors learned from that initial experience. Moreover, a
recent study finds that in the late 1990s toward the end of the
Clinton administration, the “marginal” merger—a close call
that the enforcement agencies chose not to challenge—led to
a small but significant increase in prices a year or so later.14
This result suggests that enforcement policy then was, if anything, too lax. With a further sustained decline in the enforcement rate, enforcement policy at the DOJ today is almost
surely inadequate.
The low merger enforcement rates at the DOJ during
both terms of the current administration and the second
term of the Reagan administration are not approached during any other presidential term during the period covered by
the data. The closest is the somewhat depressed rate during
the second term of the current administration at the FTC,
which is slightly less than halfway between the historical
average and the low DOJ rates. The Clinton administration
enforcement action rate, like the enforcement action rate at
the FTC during the first term of the current administration,
was close to the historical average, indicating that these
enforcers did not surprise the antirust bar with their approach
to merger review. In particular, the Pitofsky FTC brought
enforcement actions at the rate of 0.75 percent of HSR filings—similar to the Muris FTC’s 0.8 percent rate, close to
the historical average of 0.9 percent, and roughly double the
rate of the current DOJ.15 The Klein DOJ was slightly above
the historical average, at 1.0 percent.16
Had the two federal enforcement agencies challenged
mergers during 2006 and 2007 at the rate the FTC did durS U M M E R
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ing the first term of the current administration, the agencies
would have challenged twenty-four more mergers each year
(fifteen more at the DOJ and nine more at the FTC). While
we do not know which particular mergers would have been
challenged had merger enforcement been closer to the average rate, and thus had merger enforcement been consistent
with the antitrust community’s expectations, this computation offers a conservative estimate of the number. In general, it is difficult to second guess individual decisions because
each case is fact intensive, most of the relevant evidence is
confidential (unless the case is litigated), and the agencies
only occasionally explain decisions not to challenge proposed
mergers. Still, one experienced practitioner in our survey
cited the Whirlpool/Maytag merger, which was permitted to
proceed without challenge by the DOJ in 2006, as a “close
deal” in today’s merger environment that “would have had a
hard time” getting through the DOJ ten years ago. Based on
our knowledge of this particular high-profile matter, we
agree. We also question the DOJ’s closing statement defending its March 2008 decision not to challenge the proposed
merger between XM and Sirius, the only two providers of
satellite radio in the United States.17
The merger enforcement data and our survey of experienced practitioners together paint a picture of declining horizontal merger enforcement, especially at the current DOJ.
Not surprisingly, one of our survey respondents stated that
he/she was advising, “If you want to do a dicey deal, get it
done before the [2008] election.” This view was echoed by a
number other respondents.
Questionable Judicial Decisions
The long-term changes in horizontal merger enforcement
have involved the courts as well as the agencies, with each at
times spurring on the other. The Merger Guidelines, and the
arguments the agencies have made when litigating challenged
mergers, have shown the courts how to conduct merger
analysis as the role of the structural presumption has diminished. At the same time, the agencies pay attention to judicial decisions for the mode of analysis they use and for the
precedent they establish. Indeed, part of the explanation for
the declining enforcement at the DOJ in recent years may be
the losses the DOJ sustained in court in the SunGard and
Oracle cases, which likely made it more cautious about bringing merger cases.18
As the structural presumption has weakened, merger
enforcement has on the whole improved. The agencies and
courts have generally used the resulting increase in decisionmaking flexibility to undertake careful, fact-based economic analyses of the competitive effects of proposed transactions.
But, as we describe in more detail in our book chapter, the
same flexibility has also permitted some courts to make mistakes in their economic analysis. In one noteworthy example,
the Ninth Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Alex Kozinski,
accepted the lower court’s view that entry was easy and that
competition was not harmed after considering whether new
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firms could enter the market, without recognizing that it is
necessary also to evaluate whether those firms likely would
do so.19
A more recent example can be found in the district court
decision declining to enjoin Oracle’s acquisition of PeopleSoft. In that case, Judge Vaughn Walker held that “[t]o prevail on a differentiated products unilateral effects claim, a
plaintiff must prove a relevant market in which the merging
parties would have essentially a monopoly or dominant position.” 20 This statement is based on a clear error in economic reasoning. A dominant position is not required for the
exercise of market power through unilateral competitive
effects even in the commonly used horizontal differentiation
model that Judge Walker appears to have in mind: unilateral effects will arise so long as some customers of one of the
merging firms consider its merger partner’s product as their
second choice, even if more of the firm’s customers consider a third firm’s products to be their second choice. If Judge
Walker’s view of the legal standard is followed by other
courts, it would create an unfortunate gap in merger law by
undermining the ability of the enforcement agencies to rely
on the theory of unilateral effects, which is well-established
in economics and has been used effectively in the past by the
agencies to attack a large class of anticompetitive mergers.
Economic Arguments Merging Firms Love to Make
In a world where the structural presumption carries less
weight than in the past, the enforcement agencies typically no
longer consider it sufficient to show that a proposed merger
will lead to a significant increase in concentration in a properly defined relevant market. Rather, in their internal merger review and in litigating challenged mergers in court, the
agencies typically seek to establish a particular mechanism by
which anticompetitive effects would occur.
We bolster the evidence set forth in our book chapter that
courts and enforcement agencies at times take the flexibility
provided by the eroding structural presumption too far by
sketching several arguments that are commonly made by
merging parties which appear to be accepted more readily by
the agencies, especially the DOJ, than in years past. These
claims may occasionally be justified by the evidence. However, these claims are unlikely to hold, and to have sufficient
force to overcome the structural presumption, nearly as often
as they are proffered by merging firms. If these arguments are
routinely and uncritically accepted by the agencies and the
courts, they would collectively remove virtually all mergers
from antitrust review.
First, the non-interventionist approach to merger control
policy relies heavily on the proposition that little can be
learned in general about the extent of rivalry, and industrial
performance, from market concentration. Our survey respondents confirm that the agencies are much more receptive
now than ten years ago to the argument that “market concentration is not a good basis for predicting competitive
effects.” A strong version of this proposition states that effec-

tive competition typically requires only three, or even two,
strong suppliers.
This argument starts from an important insight—that
evaluating likely competitive effects involves more than measuring changes in concentration—but goes too far. Modern
oligopoly theory makes clear that in the absence of entry
and merger efficiencies, a merger that leads to a substantial
increase in market concentration will tend to raise price,
harm consumers, and reduce economic efficiency. By the
nature of game theory, there are special cases where concentration does not matter, but these examples are not robust.
For example, suppose firms offer differentiated products and
set prices independently. There is a general result in such
models that mergers will raise price unless they trigger new
entry or product repositioning by existing competitors or
generate merger-specific efficiencies. In one special case, however, a merger will have no impact on price, so long as at least
two firms remain after the merger: the case in which the
firms sell homogeneous products, have identical costs, and set
prices in a one-shot (Bertrand) game. In this very special
case, prices are equal to marginal cost so long as at least two
firms remain after the merger. In virtually all mergers, this
special case can easily be shown not to apply; usually, one can
directly observe that prices are not close to marginal cost, typically because the firms sell differentiated products or brand
names are important, and over the long run real-world pricecost margins must be large enough to allow recovery of various fixed costs such as R&D costs.
Likewise, economic theory says that, in a bidding market,
mergers typically cause price to rise, unless one of the merging firms is generally known to be an ineffective competitor,
in the sense that it has no real chance of being the first or second choice of any buyer.21 Yet this does not stop merging
firms, and non-interventionists, from arguing that “two is
enough.” Plus, additional dangers arise under a theory of
coordinated effects when a maverick is acquired by one of its
rivals. Overall, in the absence of merger synergies, oligopoly
theory robustly predicts that losing a significant competitor
will lead to higher prices.
We are not suggesting a return to a mechanical, concentration-based approach to merger policy. We are simply
pointing out that large increases in market concentration
should be given real weight in merger analysis, and that any
contrary presumption that “two is enough” (or even three) is
unsupported by economic theory. Likewise, the empirical
literature finds that substantial increases in concentration
may generate significant increases in price, although many
factors other than concentration are also important in determining the price effects of mergers.22
Similarly, one sometimes hears that “the prospect of entry
typically deters or counteracts anticompetitive effects of
mergers.” Again, there are simple economic models in which
the prospect of entry does indeed counteract or deter any
competitive problem. These include the model in which
there is a perfectly elastic supply from entrants at the current

market price, and the model of contestable markets in which
entry does not involve any sunk costs. These variants of the
standard model of perfect competition might apply to some
markets, but they are extremely special and certainly not an
appropriate basis for a general presumption in merger policy. Moreover, contrary to what is sometimes suggested, the
mere presence of some examples of entry, in which the
entrants have not (yet) exited the market, should not form a
basis for embracing the view that entry will solve any competitive problem caused by the merger, especially when the
shares of the merging firms are large and those of the recent
entrants are small. Whether entry would solve or counteract
the competitive problem from merger is a matter for analysis not presumption.
Finally, we offer a caution with respect to evaluating efficiency claims, which are increasingly and appropriately taken
seriously by courts and enforcers. There is considerable evidence that acquiring firms are systematically over-optimistic
about the efficiencies they can achieve through acquisition.
This evidence does not support the view that merger-specific efficiencies are common or that claims of efficiencies made
by merging parties should generally be credited. While some
mergers are undoubtedly motivated by the pursuit of genuine
efficiencies and go on to generate them, arguments by merging firms that efficiencies will enhance their ability and incentive to compete, resulting in lower prices, higher quality or
new products, should be accepted only after careful analysis,
not based solely on their plausibility.
Structuring Merger Analysis in a
Post-Chicago World
The challenge facing those who seek effective and principled
merger enforcement policy is to develop a set of analytical
steps that charts a moderate course: relying on measures of
market share but not excessively, and not accepting the three
“E” arguments of entry, expansion, and efficiencies without
first testing them rigorously using real-world evidence.
We believe that such a moderate course must include the
use of suitably crafted presumptions that have real bite in the
sense that strong evidence is required to overcome them.
Unless the agencies have some simple and sensible way of
establishing a presumption of harm to competition, consistent with sound economic analysis, which the merging parties must then overcome to persuade a court to permit the
transaction, few proposed mergers will be subject to effective
challenge. While some may welcome that result, we do not
believe such a lax approach to merger enforcement is consistent with sound antitrust policy, or with the statutory language or intent of Congress.
It is essential that presumptions employed in merger
review have a sound economic grounding. They must be
based on observable features of market structure that economic understanding suggests correlate well with harm to
competition. The time has come to update the structural
presumption to reflect advances in economic learning as well
S U M M E R
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as the lessons learned from the record of merger enforcement over the past forty years. We do not seek to discard the
structural presumption, nor to return to the more mechanical approach from the 1960s. Rather we seek to reinvigorate
horizontal merger enforcement with presumptions that are
both practical and based on sound economic analysis.
To do so, we outline the factual showing we think should
be sufficient to create a presumption that a proposed horizontal merger creates adverse coordinated or unilateral competitive effects, given the modern economic understanding of
the effects of mergers on competition. We intend this stage
of the analysis to fill the dual role the structural presumption
has played in the past: to identify factual showings that would
satisfy the agency’s initial burden, and to give a court confidence that if the specified elements are ultimately established, harm to competition would indeed likely result.
Under our recommended approach, rebuttal is certainly possible, but requires that the merging parties present strong evidence, consistent with premerger market conditions and economic theory, showing that the anticompetitive effects
alleged by the agency are not in fact likely to result from the
merger.
We also intend the presumptions we set forth to be consistent with the established legal framework for merger analysis. Since the 1960s, the Supreme Court has come to recognize in other areas of antitrust that direct evidence of harm
to competition can obviate the need for inferring that harm
from market concentration.23 Indeed, direct evidence regarding competition, such as evidence of buyer responses to past
price movements or the costs of consumer switching, can be
more probative than indirect evidence in the form of market
shares. To the extent we employ markers other than market
concentration for identifying adverse competitive effects,
therefore, we think that doing so is consistent with the contemporary judicial understanding of the role played by market structure and other economic evidence in demonstrating
market power and anticompetitive effects.
We propose two different, alternative approaches to establishing a presumption of harm to competition through coordinated effects.24 Both approaches begin by defining the relevant market, along the lines described in the Merger
Guidelines, and by showing that the firms participating in
that market could reasonably expect to solve the “cartel problems” of reaching consensus on terms of coordination and
deterring deviation from those terms. Beginning with market definition dovetails nicely with theories of coordinated
effects, since it involves identifying a group of firms, including the merging parties, that would find it profitable to
engage in coordination.
Then the agency must explain why it is plausible that the
merger will harm competition, relying on either of two
approaches. Under the first route for establishing a presumption that the merger will have an anticompetitive effect,
the agency would identify the likely maverick, and explain
how the merger would change the maverick’s incentives so as
3 4
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to make coordination more likely or more effective. Proof
that the acquisition involves a likely maverick should be sufficient basis to presume harm to competition, for example.
Under the second route, the agency would show that the
odds are high that a maverick firm (not specifically identified) would prefer a higher coordinated price post-merger,
thus making coordination more likely or successful. To do
so, the agency would look to the number of significant
firms—firms that could not be ignored by a cartel—and to
the effect of the merger on the differences among sellers. We
could imagine several ways of making the necessary demonstration. One involves simply a reduction in the number of
significant firms. Alternatively, if it is difficult to be confident which individual sellers are significant, a presumption
based solely on market concentration could be applied. At
lower levels of concentration than would be sufficient to
invoke a presumption based on concentration alone, a court
could still presume that the merger makes coordination
more likely or more effective if the agency also shows that
the merger has made sellers more similar, as by reducing
asymmetries in costs or product attributes. Consistent with
the legal framework, these presumptions would be rebuttable. But rebuttal arguments based on entry, expansion,
and efficiencies must be based on strong evidence that is
consistent with economic theory and premerger industry
conditions in order to prevail.
Our proposal for establishing presumptions in merger
cases alleging unilateral effects among sellers of differentiated products also allows the agency to establish its prima facie
case in either of two ways. Both routes require the agency to
show that the merger will give the merged firm an incentive
to raise the price of one or more of its products significantly, taking as given the prices charged by non-merging firms.
The first and more traditional route is for the agency to
define the relevant market, following the methods in the
Merger Guidelines, show that the merger will substantially
increase concentration in that market, and articulate the
mechanism by which the merger will cause a price increase.
This mechanism will typically follow from the basic logic of
unilateral competitive effects, with reference to the size of the
diversion ratios and premerger price-cost margins on the
overlap products sold by the merging firms.25 If the market
shares of the merging firms are small, for example, the agency
may fail to meet its initial burden. This route is consistent
with a “default” assumption that the diversion ratios between
the products sold by the merging firms are proportional to
their market shares, as in the logit model of demand. This
assumption could be rebutted by evidence showing that the
products sold by the merging firms are relatively distant substitutes within the relevant market. Contrary to what the
court required in Oracle, we would not insist that the merged
firm have a dominant or near-dominant market share.
The second route is more direct and does not rely on
defining the relevant market and measuring market shares.
Following this route, the agency must establish that the diver-

sion ratio between the merging firms’ products and the gross
margins on those products are large enough to give the
merged firm an incentive to raise the price of one or more of
those products significantly. Diversion ratios would summarize the information as to buyer substitution between the
products sold by the merging firms in a quantitative way,
even if the most probative evidence about the magnitude of
buyer substitution were qualitative rather than quantitative.
We envision the agency offering a straightforward calculation
based on diversion ratios and price-cost margins, along with
some sensitivity analysis, although the agency also could
obtain the benefit of the presumption by presenting a more
detailed simulation model.26
We certainly do not propose a return to the horizontal
merger control policies and precedents of the 1960s. The presumptions we have described would not be irrebuttable,
though they would be influential. They would be based on
aspects of market structure, but not solely on market concentration, and in some cases, not on market concentration
at all.
We hope that our proposals will stimulate discussion about
how best to reinvigorate merger enforcement, while leaving
the details of an improved merger control framework to that
discussion and future work.
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In his sidebar, Timothy Muris suggests that the very high enforcement rate
of the Steiger FTC is explained by its unusual willingness to accept “cheap”
consent settlements following a limited investigation (which he implicitly
assumes reflect settlements taken without an underlying antitrust violation
rather than inadequate remedies for serious competitive problems), that a
wave of radio mergers during the late 1990s explains why the Klein DOJ
enforcement rate exceeded that of the Pitofsky FTC (notwithstanding that
only one in seven such transactions was HSR reportable), and that the
Majoras FTC was an “aggressive” enforcer (rather than simply doing its job)
given that the merging firms declined to settle three transactions that the
agency found troublesome on terms the FTC would accept and chose
instead to litigate. Muris, supra note 5, at 38. Whatever the merits of these
suggestions, they do not explain away a key “apples to apples” (as Muris
would put it) statistical comparison, confirmed by our survey results: that the
FTC challenged mergers at about the historical rate during the first term of
the current administration, while the DOJ leadership during the same period challenged mergers at an unusually low rate.
Statement of the Department of Justice Antitrust Division on Its Decision
to Close Its Investigation of XM Satellite Radio Holdings Inc.’s Merger with
Sirius Satellite Radio Inc., available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/
press_releases/2008/231467.htm. Most notably, the statement acknowledges that direct competition between XM and Sirius had reduced the price
paid by car buyers for satellite radio systems. Yet the Department permitted XM and Sirius to merge, in large part on the ground that they had
entered into exclusive dealing agreements with automobile manufactures
that last for several years. Taken on its face, this approach denies consumers the benefits of competition once those exclusive dealing agreements
end. The Department conjectures that new alternatives to satellite radio may
emerge in the future, by the time the long term exclusive agreements with
car manufacturers expire. But the statement also recognizes that it is difficult to predict whether and when these alternatives would become attractive to satellite radio buyers, and the statement does not analyze the extent
to which these alternatives would be viewed by buyers as sufficiently close
substitutes to prevent adverse unilateral competitive effects.
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